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Power Without Property, Still:  
Unger, Berle, and the Derivatives Revolution 
Cristie Ford† and Carol Liao†† 
INTRODUCTION 
We are in a time when the notion of property is in flux.1  The deriv-
atives revolution2 has shattered the “atom of property” well beyond what 
was originally imagined in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.3  
This disaggregation has had fascinating, and often adverse, effects on 
corporate law and securities regulation.  Moreover, the phenomenon has 
had the unexpected effect of permitting some parties that already possess 
considerable social, economic, and political power to accumulate even 
more. 
Innovations in modern finance have generated a large-scale expe-
riment, running live and on a global basis, on the impacts of disassem-
bling classical notions of ownership and property rights.  At the level of 
corporate law, Henry Hu and Bernard Black have examined the delete-
rious potential effects that arise from so-called “empty voting” and “hid-
den (morphable) ownership,” where derivatives have allowed investors 
                                                 
 
† Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. 
†† LL.M. Candidate, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law.  The authors would like to 
thank Alex Burton, Sam Cole, Kyle Fogden, Scott Reinhart, and the participants at In Berle’s Foot-
steps, a symposium celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law, 
and Society at Seattle University School of Law, for helpful comments. 
 1. Borrowing the title “Property in Flux” from Book I of ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) 
(1932). 
 2. The term is not a new one.  For a prescient analysis of the systemic risk associated with 
widespread use of over-the-counter derivatives, see Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at the Eighth Annual 
Symposium for the Foundation for Research in International Banking and Finance: The Derivatives 
Revolution and the World Financial System (Oct. 14, 1993), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/101493schapiro.pdf. 
 3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 8–9 (describing the “dissolution of the old atom of owner-
ship into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership”). 
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to readily separate economic ownership of shares from voting rights.4  
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives also enabled the originate-to-
distribute model of lending by financial institutions, which many regard 
as the catalyst for the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and, 
subsequently, for the global financial crisis.5  In this model, financial in-
stitutions originate consumer mortgage loans which are then tranched, 
repackaged, and resold in the market to investors, creating a separation in 
the mortgagor/mortgagee relationship and the accompanying risks.  At 
the level of global markets, the capacity to break traditional property 
rights down into constituent elements has also made possible an enorm-
ous and interconnected market for synthetic financial products, characte-
rized by unprecedented complexity and susceptibility to system effects. 
The effect of the disunity of property and its relation to power is in-
teresting to observe when juxtaposed against the theories of Roberto Un-
ger and Adolf Berle.  Both talk about the breakdown of traditional prop-
erty rights, though from markedly different perspectives.  Unger offers a 
prescription for the radical destabilization of traditional property rights 
within society in the service of a more egalitarian and inclusive citize-
nry.6  Unger suggests that the fracturing of property rights (as he de-
scribes it, not as expressed in recent real world examples7) is a pro-
democratic move. Berle, on the other hand, though he could not have 
imagined the degree to which property would break down, argued that 
the disaggregation of property rights results in concentrations of power 
and unaccountable concentrations of power are bad things.  Recent 
events suggest that, somewhat contrary to Unger, power relationships 
will reassert themselves in malleable social and economic space, such as 
that created by a breakdown in traditional property rights.  The absence 
of formal ownership rights will make people more, not less, vulnerable to 
nontransparent exercises of power.  Understanding the pervasive impact 
                                                 
 
 4. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Mor-
phable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
 5. The global financial crisis is broad in scope.  Focusing only on the United States, the first 
effects of the subprime mortgage crisis began in 2006–2007, culminating with the collapse of global 
credit markets in fall 2008.  During the 2008 collapse, major U.S. investment banks failed, bringing 
about an industry bailout and economic stimulus package of unprecedented size.  For a timeline of 
the core of the crisis—from September 2008 to September 2009—see R.M. Schneiderman, A Year of 
Financial Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2009/09/11/business/economy/20090911_FINANCIALCRISIS_TIMELINE.html?ref=businessspeci
al4. 
 6. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN 
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (2001) [hereinafter UNGER, FALSE 
NECESSITY]. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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of power on human ordering, as Berle did, and addressing it in future 
lawmaking will allow us to increase the effectiveness of our regulatory 
frameworks. 
This is not to say that we should dismiss Unger’s insights.  On the 
contrary, his work continues to be compelling and ought to be grappled 
with in a conversation about the contemporary breakdown of property 
and the effect of power.  In particular, Unger’s recognition that accepted 
social constructs, including private property, often have the effect of in-
sulating power from challenge—and his consequent demand for what he 
calls “destabilization rights”—still resonates.  Indeed, this aspect of Un-
gerian theory is having a real world policy impact through its more 
pragmatic and concrete (but not necessarily less provocative) descendant: 
new governance scholarship.  The new governance movement has 
adopted the notion of destabilization rights, among other Unger-informed 
pieces, and has had increasing practical influence on regulatory design.8 
This article begins in Part I with a broad strokes refresher on some 
of the theoretical concepts underlying Unger’s work, particularly focus-
ing on his notion of destabilization rights and the disaggregation of prop-
erty to disentrenchment deeply rooted forms of social domination.  
Part II then explores real life experiments in modern finance where prop-
erty rights have been decoupled, specifically highlighting the phenome-
non of new vote buying as identified by Hu and Black, the originate-to-
distribute model of lending in the subprime mortgage market, and the 
exponential growth of the OTC derivatives in global markets.  These ex-
amples are reminiscent of Unger’s “context-smashing” agenda and yet 
have resulted in markedly negative outcomes for our economic times.  
Part III draws upon the lessons found within these modern day experi-
ments and identifies how the complex and nontransparent nature of dis-
aggregated property, as well as the opportunistic pull towards excessive 
risk-taking behavior, has fostered an environment that allows larger ma-
nifestations of power to form within society.  Finally, in Part IV we re-
flect upon the pervasive and persistent nature of power in relation to Un-
ger’s theories and explore the implications of this power to new gover-
nance scholarship.  Drawing on Berle’s insights, we recognize how un-
derstanding the ability of power to reassert itself and coalesce in liquid 
markets is essential to effective planning and design of institutional and 
regulatory frameworks.  Ultimately, our argument is that power, not 
property, is actually at the core of both Unger’s and Berle’s works and 
                                                 
 
 8. See infra notes 126–44 and accompanying text (describing new governance). 
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also at the core of contemporary structural problems in corporate law and 
financial regulation. 
This is an early stage work, a starting point that we hope will foster 
a dialogue on the relationship between the disaggregation of property and 
its problematic connection to greater concentrations of power.  This ar-
ticle serves as an examination and critique of Ungerian theory and also a 
reflection on Berle’s work.  Recent developments in structured finance 
help to shed light on these authors’ core concerns, just as their work 
sheds light on those recent developments.  In addition, this is a thought 
experiment in the spirit of the careful work of Hu and Black, and others, 
which challenges the way in which increasingly complex and innovative 
financial instruments are becoming mechanisms for reinforcing power 
and exclusivity.  We recognize the challenges that come with applying 
theory (especially radical theory) to actual practice and the imperfections 
that, no doubt, faithfully accompany it.  Nevertheless the conversation 
seems to us to be an important one as we continue to chart a path for fi-
nancial regulation in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 
I.  UNGER’S DESTABILIZATION RIGHTS AND  
CONCEPT OF PROPERTY—A REFRESHER 
Unger’s work is extensive, spanning the fields of philosophy, law, 
and politics, all the while offering an alternative way of explaining socie-
ty and putting forward a program for changing it.  One of his central in-
sights is that no particular form of social constraint is necessary or ines-
capable.9  For Unger, “[t]he great inspiring idea of the most successful 
efforts of modern social thought has been the idea of emancipation from 
false necessity.”10  He believes society can improve relative to how it 
currently operates, contending that “[w]e can construct not just new and 
different social worlds but social worlds that more fully embody and re-
spect the creative power whose suppression or containment all societies 
and cultures seem to require.”11  Key to this is a recommendation that 
society should move towards the positive goal of creating social struc-
tures that will lessen “the distance between context-preserving routine 
and context-transforming conflict.”12  These new social structures are 
                                                 
 
 9. E.g., UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 2.  For a helpful review of Unger’s central 
works, see Bernard Yack, Toward a Free Marketplace of Social Institutions: Roberto Unger’s ‘Su-
per-Liberal’ Theory of Emancipation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1961 (1988). 
 10. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 137 
(1987) [hereinafter UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY]. 
 11. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 1. 
 12. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
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prevented from forming into immovable constructions of hierarchy or 
domination since they are vulnerable to challenge and revision.  By 
building these plastic and self-disrupting structures, we thus 
“cleans[e] . . . the taint of dependence and domination” from our social 
institutions.13 
Underpinning Unger’s approach is a stylized view of human nature 
as social, flexible, contentious, full of possibility, and poorly served by 
rigidity, routine, and hierarchy.  For him, human flourishing is about 
permitting the greatest degree of individual self-actualization, subjected 
to the fewest cognitive, structural, and imaginative constraints.  He says, 
“[t]o be fully a person . . . you must engage in a struggle against the de-
fects or the limits of existing society or available knowledge.”14  Self-
subverting social structures promote greater human happiness as well as 
freedom of social thought.  Greater degrees of social plasticity, including 
more “elastic” and structure-denying structures, also allow society to 
obtain greater wealth and power for all its citizens.15  In Unger’s view, 
citizen subversion and disillusionment by ruling forces have presently 
subdued humanity into a “restless peace.”16  Once citizens rebel against 
the worlds that have been built, breaking apart the constraints on their 
transformative wills, humanity will be empowered.  In this way, socie-
ty’s practical success becomes a function of its capacity for permanent 
innovation. 
In order to achieve the plasticity that Unger speaks of, new forms of 
rights and institutions are required.  These rights are designed to advance 
the emancipation of the individual.  One of these rights Unger calls “des-
tabilization rights,” which operate as self-disrupting structures that per-
mit “transformative action” and “context-smashing” in the service of a 
more inclusive, egalitarian, and ennobling society.17  Large-scale organi-
zations and ingrained forms of social practice that are unaffected by or-
dinary destabilizing effects “sustain insulated hierarchies of power and 
advantage.”18  Thus, destabilization rights protect citizens’ interests by 
“breaking open” these entrenched institutions and areas of practice.  
                                                 
 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. Id. at 29. 
 15. Id. at 210. 
 16. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at xvii. 
 17. Unger proposes four fundamentally restructured categories of rights: immunity rights, 
which protect the individual from the state, organizations, and other individuals; destabilization 
rights, which make it possible to dismantle institutions and practices that create social hierarchy and 
division; market rights, which constitute claims to social capital and replace conventional property 
rights; and solidarity rights, which are “the legal entitlements of communal life.”  Id. at 508–538. 
 18. Id. at 530. 
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They allow a correspondence between normative convictions about liber-
ty, equality, and justice, and the social institutions through which citizens 
attempt to make those convictions a reality.19  According to Unger, the 
goal is not to reach a particular version of institutional structuralism so 
much as to guarantee ongoing contingency.  Unger points to the practice 
of court-ordered injunctive relief as an example of destabilization rights 
found in contemporary law, citing institutions such as schools and mental 
hospitals, as well as the social practice of electoral organization, as loci 
in which these rights have previously been exercised.20  He says these 
examples “serve not to embody specific ideals of human association but 
to ensure that, whatever the . . . forms of . . . association may be, they 
will preserve certain minimal qualities: above all, the quality of being 
readily replaceable.”21 
The Relationship to Property Rights 
Unger’s destabilization rights are inextricably linked to his belief in 
the need for the disentrenchment of property rights held by ruling groups.  
Unger believes that the present forms of modern liberal democracies, 
which thrive on the passivity of their citizens, are based on the existence 
of absolute property rights.  Berle and Means also famously recognized a 
level of passivity among the citizenry through the dispersion of share 
ownership and the constructive inability of shareholders to affect the un-
derlying property that they own.22  In Unger’s estimation, the current 
political forms within society “are neither the necessary nor the best ex-
pressions of inherited ideals of liberty and equality.”23  In fact, absolute 
property rights “frustrate the very goals for whose sake we uphold them” 
in that they are used to justify and perpetuate existing unequal distribu-
                                                 
 
 19. Unger observed that both negative and positive uses accompany destabilization rights.  The 
negative use is seen in circumstances where institutions are insulated from conflict in a way that 
seems to perpetuate “stable ties of domination and dependence.”  Destabilization rights deny protec-
tion to these institutions, leaving them vulnerable to conflict through things such as market forces 
and democratic deliberation.  The focus then turns to ensuring the institutions in question “remain 
available to some mode of attack.”  Unger places value on strengthening this “negative capability” as 
a level of human freedom in and of itself and also as a method of achieving other goals.  When the 
focus “falls on the evil to be remedied rather than on its cause,” there is then a positive aspect whe-
reby the destabilization right acts as an entitlement on the citizen to prevent groups from gaining a 
privileged hold upon “the means for creating the social future within the social present.”  In this 
sense, the destabilization right causes attention to be drawn to the ways in which insulation from 
conflict perpetuates these existing patterns of control and dependence.  Id. at 531. 
 20. Id. at 532. 
 21. Id.  See also id. at 1–8, 530–32. 
 22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 64. 
 23. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
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tions of political and economic power.24  Absolute property rights are 
linked to the market institution and only support one version of the mar-
ketplace; they serve as an “indispensable prop” to justify the unequal 
distribution of political and economic wealth.  In this sense, Unger finds 
that “social democracy makes the liberal project of the enlightenment—
the cause of liberty, equality, and fraternity—unnecessarily hostage to a 
transitory and replaceable institutional order.”25 
Unger believes markets based on absolute property rights, the “pri-
vate rights complex,” are one of the pillars of that institutional order.  
They are a “formative context”—that is, an institutional and imaginative 
structure of social life that “circumscribe[s] our routine practical or dis-
cursive activities and conflicts . . . .”26  Creating openness and flexibility 
within these formative contexts is imperative in the pursuit of a more 
empowering social order.  Unger insists that a market economy has no 
necessary set of built-in legal-institutional arrangements.  Rather, “insti-
tutional fetishism” has perpetuated a “mythical history” that alleges some 
necessary connection between private rights, the market, and ultimately 
democracy.27  Moreover, Unger argues that Western liberal democracy is 
held hostage by ruling groups that own large proportions of property.  In 
Ungerian terms, there has been an ascendancy of the “consolidated prop-
erty right.”28  The consolidated property right stands in the way of greater 
degrees of economic decentralization and drastically restricts our capaci-
ty to envision possible alternatives to current market systems. 
To liberate humans from this control, Unger argues for disaggregat-
ing property and abolishing consolidated property holdings to force 
greater societal plasticity.  His prescription: a three-tiered property struc-
ture under which the conditions and terms of economic growth can be 
reconciled with democratic experimentalism.29  Specifically, this struc-
ture would entail a transfer of control over major productive assets to a 
“rotating capital fund” which would disaggregate property rights down 
through tiers.30  The capital fund would be controlled by a centralized 
democratic government that would then lease the capital on a competi-
tive basis to autonomous investment funds operating in different sectors 
which, in turn, would auction or ration resources to various teams of pro-
                                                 
 
 24. Id. at 7. 
 25. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 27. 
 26. Id. at 7, 304. 
 27. Id. at 196–207, 211–13. 
 28. Id. at 511–13. 
 29. Id. at 491–501. 
 30. Id. at 491–502; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE 
PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998) [hereinafter UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED]. 
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ducers and innovators for set periods of time.31  Citizens would have wel-
fare rights guaranteeing minimum income, to protect them from the va-
garies of markets.  This would allow the capital-takers to be even more 
innovative and take bigger risks.32  Unger thereby replaces absolute, con-
solidated property rights with a method of reallocating disassembled 
elements of property among various citizens.  Once certain limits of 
“personal enrichment and enterprise investment” have reached their natu-
ral capacities or saturation points within society, the additional capital is 
returned to the original capital fund for further investment by the next 
team of innovators.33 
Human creativity and initiative play a large role in Unger’s vision.  
The first stage in his prescription requires the recognition of a false ne-
cessity in deeply embedded structures and institutions that limit freedom 
and serve to perpetuate the power of a privileged few in the current so-
cial hierarchy.  Destabilization and disentrenchment of these structures is 
the first step to rescuing humanity from the ingrained and oppressive sta-
tus quo.  Unger knows, of course, that destabilization is not enough; ra-
ther, it is the “intervention provoked by the exercise of a destabilization 
right [that] must change the disrupted practice . . . .”34  The next step then 
rests on Unger’s vision of an empowered and empowering democracy.  It 
is up to a newly liberated populace to investigate and actualize a fuller 
range of imaginative possibilities.  At this stage, in Unger’s view, op-
pression is not tolerated and a climate develops in which radical meas-
ures seem both practical and desirable, with new conceptions forming 
among a creative citizenry, free from the invisible shackles of a powerful 
elite. 
Obviously, Unger’s vision has not been realized at this stage. What 
is curious is that, stripped of its normative agenda, there are aspects of 
Unger’s prescription that could be said to describe recent real world 
                                                 
 
 31. Unger claims that his theory satisfies the imperative of economies of scale by developing 
an alternative economic order that makes it possible to pool manpower, technology, and financial 
capital without distributing permanent and unqualified rights to their use.  See UNGER, FALSE 
NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 491–502. 
 32. See infra notes 114 and 115 on how the American public and its government may currently 
be resistant to the idea of greater risk taking. 
 33. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 496.  In his book, Democracy Realized, Unger 
is more concrete in his analysis and advocates in favor of shattering boundaries that allow for the 
consolidation of property.  He suggests structural changes that would eliminate private inheritance in 
favor of social inheritance mechanisms, encourage private saving, implement a broad-based con-
sumption tax, and unify all private and public pension funds (some of which would then be used in 
the capital fund).  An additional branch of government would be created to enforce such positive 
rights.  UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED, supra note 30, at 133–251. 
 34. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 6, at 531. 
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events in corporate law and financial regulation.  Property rights have 
been disaggregated, though this took place first at the individual share 
level and only subsequently and partially at the systemic level Unger de-
scribes.  And, this has had the effect of spurring innovation and creativity 
and radically expanding the imaginative possibilities when it comes to 
the treatment of property in the markets.  Yet, while bold, decentralized 
innovation and the deconstruction of traditional structures are part of 
Ungerian theory, recent examples suggest this destabilization is of a dif-
ferent nature than what Unger imagined.  The following examples high-
light the effects of the atomization of property rights and suggest Unger’s 
project does not match real world capabilities; instead, the disaggregation 
of property seems to exacerbate inequality and allow for greater power to 
amass among the already powerful.  Following these examples, we con-
sider the broader ramifications of leaving such faith in human nature to 
manage this open, unfixed space of revisionary ideals. 
II.  CLASSICAL NOTIONS OF PROPERTY AND  
REAL LIFE EXPERIMENTS IN MODERN FINANCE 
Implications for Corporate Law: The “New Vote Buying” 
A classical property rights description within a corporation would 
expect shareholder voting rights to be assigned to common shareholders 
in proportion to share ownership.  In this way, a shareholder’s voting 
interests are tied to economic ownership, so there is an incentive to exer-
cise voting rights to increase share value.  Shareholder voting has been 
regarded by some as legitimating the concept of managers controlling 
property they themselves do not own.35  Shareholders are regarded as the 
residual claimants to a firm’s income and thus the ability to exercise pro-
portionate voting power among holders is logically sound.  This is not 
ignored by the courts; Delaware takeover law has traditionally favored 
shareholder voting decisions over market decisions.  Delaware courts 
have also habitually given great deference to actions reflecting share-
holder votes.36 
The common debate regarding governance of public corporations 
typically rests on whether or not shareholder voting can effectively influ-
ence corporate management if ownership is widely dispersed.  Berle and 
Means noted in 1932 that shareholders in public companies are subser-
                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 63–67 (1991). 
 36. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 850 (citing Blasius Indus, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 
A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
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vient to directors “who can employ the proxy machinery to become a 
self-perpetuating body . . . .”37  Scholars in the years since have contin-
ued to weigh in on the subject.  Some scholars agree with Berle and 
Means that shareholder voting power is insignificant because the ob-
stacles in the way of achieving collective action are too difficult and ex-
pensive to surmount.38  Others see virtue in this structure, finding board 
control promotes efficient and informed decision-making, deters inter-
shareholder opportunism, and allows for greater investment in other cor-
porate stakeholders.39  Still others maintain that shareholders actually do 
have meaningful control over the corporation, even in cases of a diverse 
ownership base with no clear majority shareholder.40 
While the debate is still relevant, it is losing some of its descriptive 
and normative force as the exponential growth and development of de-
rivatives has begun to adjust common assumptions related to shareholder 
voting rights.  The derivatives revolution has changed underlying condi-
tions.  The conversation, also, should be moving away from the issue of 
whether or not shareholder voting has an impact on corporate control 
(and whether this is good or bad), and towards the question of who ac-
tually holds the voting rights and how decisions can be manipulated by a 
recently exposed phenomenon in corporate law: new vote buying using 
equity derivatives. 
For those unfamiliar, derivatives are financial instruments that are 
derived from some other underlying asset.  Derivatives can generally be 
classified into three groups: futures/forwards, swaps, and options.  Every 
derivative specifies a future price at which some item can or must be 
sold.  The present value of a derivative is determined, in part, by value 
fluctuations in the underlying asset.  The underlying asset may be a 
commodity, a financial security, or something more abstract like a price 
index.  A simple historical example of a forward derivative would be an 
agreement between a farmer and a miller on the price to be paid in the 
future for the farmer’s yet-to-be-harvested wheat crop.  In this agree-
ment, the farmer hedges against the risk that the market price of his or 
her wheat will be lower in the future than the current price agreed upon 
with the miller, and vice versa for the miller, who hedges against the risk 
that the future market price will be higher.  Today, much derivatives ac-
                                                 
 
 37. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 6. 
 38. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 
(2007). 
 39. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 
(2007). 
 40. See, e.g., Dennis Leech, Corporate Ownership and Control: A New Look at the Evidence of 
Berle and Means, 39 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 534 (1987). 
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tivity is fundamentally concerned with the process of unbundling and 
repackaging credit and market risk and, particularly for the investor, with 
whether a derivative effectively hedges an existing risk.41 
Additionally, in the corporate law context, derivatives have been 
employed by sophisticated investors to separate economic ownership of 
shares from their corresponding voting rights.  Particularly, growth in 
equity swaps and other OTC equity derivatives have made it easy to dis-
assemble interests and allow for vote buying on the market.  In a cele-
brated series of recent articles, Henry Hu and Bernard Black have written 
extensively on this new phenomenon of vote buying and its broader im-
plications.42  Hu and Black note that “decoupling” has become a world-
wide phenomenon over the last several years, although it is still “largely 
unregulated and often unseen.”43  They describe two main varieties: 
“empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) ownership.” 
In empty voting, investors are able to separate their interests and 
hold more votes than their economic ownership traditionally allows.  
This decoupling is achieved through various equity derivatives.44  One 
method is through the share lending market which allows investors to 
borrow shares from one another.  Under this arrangement, the borrower 
can temporarily hold voting rights without economic ownership, while 
the reverse is true for the lender, who holds onto economic ownership 
without having the accompanying votes for a period of time.45  Along 
these lines, using record date capture, the investor could borrow shares 
just before the record date for a shareholder vote, and then reverse the 
transaction afterwards—providing the investor with the right to vote 
even though he or she has no positive economic interest in the compa-
ny’s success.46  Alternatively, through equity swaps, an investor with the 
“equity leg” of the swap can acquire the economic ownership of shares 
                                                 
 
 41. See generally MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES (1997). 
 42. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview, 12 
M&A LAW. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, An Overview]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, 
Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 663 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling]; Henry T. C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and 
Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Taxonomy, Implications, and Re-
forms]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Impor-
tance and Extensions, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Empty Voting II]; 
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and 
Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and Decoupling]; Hu & Black, supra note 4. 
 43. Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 818. 
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(but not the voting rights) from the “interest leg.”  More often than not, 
the interest leg (or short-side) hedges its economic risk by holding onto 
the shares, resulting in the short-side investor having votes without any 
net economic interest.47  A third method popular among corporate insid-
ers is the use of zero-cost collars, which involves buying a put option (to 
limit downside) while simultaneously selling a call option (thus reducing 
potential gain).  The collar preserves voting rights but sharply reduces 
one’s economic ownership.48 
The impact of insider decoupling of share-based interests is mixed 
in that, on the one hand, it may “mitigate the risk-taking conflict between 
managers and diversified shareholders,” but on the other hand, it could 
weaken the market for corporate control as a disciplining mechanism.  In 
empty voting scenarios, a vote holder may have limited, no, or even neg-
ative economic interest and subsequently have an incentive to vote in 
ways that reduce share value.  Hu and Black provide the example of 
Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc. (M-Flex), a Delaware company, which in 
2006, offered to purchase MFS Technology Ltd. (MFS), a Singapore 
company.49  Under M-Flex’s charter, affirmative votes by both a majori-
ty of all shareholders and a majority of minority shareholders were re-
quired to approve the transaction.  M-Flex set up a special committee to 
investigate whether the deal was beneficial for its minority shareholders; 
the committee determined that the terms were unfavorable and recom-
mended that minority shareholders vote against the acquisition.  Stark 
Master Fund Ltd. (Stark), a hedge fund, held at least a 48% minority 
shareholder interest in M-Flex but, despite the special committee rec-
ommendation, had the incentive to vote for the deal even if it was bad for 
M-Flex’s minority shareholders.  This was because Stark had hedged all 
or most of its economic interest in M-Flex and also had a large coupled 
interest in the target company.  Thus as an “empty voter” of M-Flex, 
Stark held a negative overall economic interest and would have benefited 
if the company overpaid for MFS. 
The M-Flex/MFS example shows how “[t]he corporate governance 
risk posed by the new vote buying is clear, but the remedy is not.”50  
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Clearly, empty voting can also be a factor in proxy fights for control, 
again attenuating the relationship between voting power and a vested 
interest in the company’s success.  In addition, as Hu and Black point 
out, “[c]leverness in vote buying—a characteristic not necessarily asso-
ciated with the ability to run the company well—may become central to 
proxy fight success.”51 
In the mirror image arrangement, “hidden (morphable) ownership,” 
investors hold more economic ownership than votes, though often with 
morphable voting rights, meaning investors hold the de facto ability to 
acquire the votes if needed.52  Hu and Black call this hidden ownership 
because the economic ownership and de facto voting ownership are often 
not disclosed.  Hidden voting is also achieved using equity derivatives—
again using equity swaps but this time only holding economic interests 
until votes are needed, when the investor can then unwind the swaps and 
buy matched shares back from the derivatives dealer. 
Hu and Black have identified several specific uses to hidden owner-
ship.  In particular, the de facto ability to obtain formal votes means 
shareholders have the ability to make voting rights disappear when they 
want to hide their stake and reappear when votes are needed.  This allows 
investors to avoid disclosing their economic interests under disclosure 
rules that rely largely on voting rights rather than economic ownership.  
It is also useful in avoiding mandatory bid rules in jurisdictions where a 
shareholder who exceeds a certain threshold of ownership (again, based 
on voting rights) must offer to buy all remaining shares at a set price.53  
Decoupling can be used to circumvent the following: statutory, contrac-
tual, and other limits on voting power; income tax rules; recapture of 
“short-swing” trading profits; limits on short sales, or “margin borrow-
ing” against the value of the shares; and antitrust rules.54  Morphable 
rights are also useful for obtaining “quiet toeholds” in companies to be 
acquired, to prevent a price run-up over a potential takeover.55  Finally, 
Hu and Black point out how the investor can use the same types of ma-
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 51. Id. at 830. 
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 54. Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 42. 
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in support of an active corporate control market). 
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neuvers to shed voting rights in order to make a target company unfavor-
able to potential purchasers.  An investor holding shares in a target com-
pany may decouple its interests and lend its voting rights to other com-
panies under the informal understanding (but not legal requirement) that 
the rights will be returned to them once a takeover threat disappears.  A 
potential purchaser has to then contend with the possibility that those 
voting rights will not be returned if they purchase the target.  This tech-
nique allows an investor to deny voting rights to another party while 
maintaining access to votes if circumstances turn in their favor.56 
From a theoretical perspective, it is easy to see how the phenome-
non of new vote buying can have significant implications for traditional 
understandings of corporate governance and in takeover contexts.  How-
ever, Hu and Black note that this impact is difficult to gauge in practice.  
In their research, they have found several examples by following up on 
rumors and combing through public disclosure documents.  Other 
sources, such as foreign regulatory changes, market customs, lawyer 
statements, and lawsuits seem to indicate that new vote buying is not an 
uncommon practice.  Ultimately though, they suggest that a great deal of 
information is still unknown.57  As of 2008, Hu and Black list over 100 
cases involving decoupling activity in over 20 countries, and they note 
that this number is “surely an underestimate of actual activity.”58  Their 
research has shown that in a takeover context, “[s]ome acquirers have 
amassed 30–45% stakes in target firms without prior disclosure.”59  Hu 
and Black note a June 2008 decision from the Southern District of New 
York, CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Investment Fund (UK) LLP. (CSX),60 
in which the court found that the two defendant hedge funds had violated 
the SEC’s pertinent “anti-evasion” rule by using equity swaps to circum-
vent disclosure rules.61  Hu and Black believe the CSX decision will like-
ly inhibit the use of equity swaps (and perhaps other equity derivatives) 
to create significant hidden ownership positions in U.S. companies; they 
also believe the decision may ultimately pressure the SEC to address the 
problematic economic-only SEC disclosure rules.  In September 2009, 
Hu was appointed the first director of the SEC’s newly established Divi-
sion of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation; so, there is reason to 
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anticipate some additional regulation around this issue in the near fu-
ture.62 
Hu and Black’s first article on the phenomenon of new vote buying 
emerged in 2006.  Since that time, they have examined the implications 
of equity decoupling in other fields, including hedge fund practices and 
the practices of corporate insiders63 and most recently have asserted that 
this decoupling is really just one instance of a broader global trend—
generally not addressed by regulation—toward decoupling the bundles of 
rights and obligations we traditionally know as equity and debt.64  In 
2008, they extended their analysis to a “second generation” of articles 
addressing “debt decoupling” and “hybrid decoupling.”  These concepts 
are touched upon in the discussion below in the context of the originate-
to-distribute model of lending in the subprime mortgage market. 
Implications for Regulating Financial Institutions: The Originate-to-
Distribute Model in the Subprime Mortgage Market 
Hu and Black refer to debt decoupling as “the unbundling [of] the 
economic and governance rights normally associated with debt, often 
through credit derivatives or securitization.”65  Hybrid decoupling, as the 
name suggests, involves combined debt and equity positions.  While debt 
decoupling has positive attributes that are well known—“it can make 
credit more widely available, reduce firms’ cost of debt capital and con-
tribute to financial stability in a variety of ways, partly by allowing lend-
ers to spread risk”—it is evident that debt decoupling also has considera-
ble downsides.66  Hu and Black note that the growth of “[d]ebt and hybr-
id decoupling can potentially produce value-decreasing outcomes at par-
ticular companies.”67  They state: 
Lenders’ ability to shed risk can weaken their incentives to assess 
and monitor debtors’ repayment ability.  Complex securitized prod-
ucts can pose model risks for both lenders and risk buyers.  New 
forms of intermediation introduce new agency costs.  M&A transac-
tions can fail because lenders were counting on securitizing their 
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loans, can no longer do so, and back away from funding commit-
ments.68 
Some of these difficulties were playing out in real time in early 
2008, around the time of Hu and Black’s articles on debt and hybrid de-
coupling.  The originate-to-distribute (OTD) lending model embodied 
many of the problematic features of debt decoupling.  Many view the 
OTD model as an instigating factor in the subprime mortgage meltdown 
that began in 2006.69  The OTD model allows banks to reduce their capi-
tal charges and transfer the risks associated with securitized loans to a 
market hungry to buy them.  The OTD strategy works as follows: bank-
ers (i) originate consumer mortgage loans (and other forms of consumer 
debt); (ii) bundle those loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), that is, OTC derivatives, 
subsequently slicing them into tranches; (iii) optionally, create additional 
OTC derivatives such as synthetic CDOs, CDOs squared and credit de-
fault swaps (whose values are derived from those underlying loans); and 
(iv) distribute the repackaged securities to investors.70 
The OTD model disaggregates the underlying mortgage interest for 
the purpose of converting the income stream from that illiquid asset (the 
mortgage) into a range of immediately sellable securities with distinct 
risk and return profiles.  An MBS or CDO will contain multiple tranches 
of securities with differing risk ratings, which will generally be paid se-
quentially from most senior to most subordinate tranche.  Other deriva-
tives in the OTD strategy include synthetic CDOs, which developed as 
an outgrowth of cash CDOs.  Synthetic CDOs are CDOs where underly-
ing risks are taken using a credit default swap (where the credit protec-
tion seller (the CDO), receives premiums in exchange for agreeing to 
assume the risk of loss on a specific asset in the event that asset expe-
riences a default).  CDOs-squared, another form of CDO-derived finan-
cial securities, are backed by CDO tranches rather than standard bonds or 
loans.  CDOs-squared allow the banks to resell the credit risk that they 
have taken in CDOs.71 
Embedded within the OTD strategy and its accompanying tools for 
packaging and repackaging derivatives is a great deal of factual and ana-
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lytical complexity.  To begin, “each type of underlying [mortgage] re-
quires a separate approach to modeling, including estimation of default 
risk, interest-rate risk and prepayment risk . . . .”72  These risks are dy-
namic in that they fluctuate over time, and models attempting to plot 
these dynamic correlations can only be approximations.  Under the OTD 
model, the breakdown of property by multiple asset classes underlying a 
given class of securities means modeling is “exponentially compli-
cated.”73 
Under the OTD strategy, most originating banks and mortgage 
lenders only held onto mortgages long enough to sell them to investors.  
The fact that the loan originators no longer held long term credit risk 
promoted a higher-risk environment for loan production.  In addition to 
creating a separation between the mortgagor/mortgagee relationship and 
the accompanying mortgage risks, the originating banks sold mortgages 
immediately to investors and were therefore able to replenish their funds 
and issue more loans to generate greater transaction fees.  The financial 
incentive was so great that it motivated banks and mortgage lenders to 
originate risky loans without adequately screening borrowers and re-
duced their incentives to monitor mortgagees’ behavior post-loan.74  A 
potential mortgagee used to be required to provide documentation prov-
ing adequate income and assets to support the loan.  With time, however, 
the requirements dwindled to a point where “No Income, No Asset” 
(NINA) mortgages were being marketed.75  In these NINA mortgages, a 
potential mortgage borrower would not be required to provide any evi-
dence of their income or asset to qualify for a loan.  This, of course, also 
meant that no information would be verified by the mortgage lender.  As 
put by one former executive director at the residential mortgage trading 
desk of Morgan Stanley: “That’s a liar’s loan.  We are telling you to lie 
to us. . . .  [W]e did it because everyone else was doing it.”76 
By 2006, the U.S. housing market was resting on what some called 
a system of “Ponzi finance” in which subprime borrowers kept taking out 
new loans from equity on their homes to pay off their existing mortgages 
on those same homes.77  When real estate prices fell in 2007, and sub-
prime homeowners could no longer refinance their loans, defaults on 
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these loans soared and the subprime financial crisis began.  In the sum-
mer of 2008, it was revealed that many large and crucially important fi-
nancial institutions had on their books large volumes of credit default 
swaps on those bundled mortgage securities generated from the OTD 
model, which had insured investors against the very defaults that were 
occurring.  This catalyzed a worldwide freeze in the credit markets in the 
fall of 2008. 
Back in April 2008, Hu and Black, in describing the negatives of 
separating economic and governance rights associated with debt, pre-
dicted what at the time seemed to be some of the more hypothetical out-
comes that could result from debt decoupling.  They said: 
[D]ecoupling can impede “debt governance”—interactions between 
creditors and firms once a loan is made, such as renegotiation of 
loan terms when the borrower can’t meet the original terms.  De-
coupling will tend to make financial restructuring harder and some-
times infeasible, both in and out of formal bankruptcy.  Spread 
across an economy, the “freezing” of debtor-creditor relationships 
can increase systemic financial risk.78 
Now, in the wake of the global financial crisis, we see that Hu and Black 
were precisely right. 
Implications for Global Markets: Growth of the OTC Derivatives Sector 
The sheer volume of the derivatives market, created through debt 
and equity decoupling, introduced additional challenges.  At the level of 
the market itself, as in the examples above, the act of disaggregating tra-
ditional property did not break up consolidated property holdings as Un-
ger had envisioned.  On the contrary, the OTC derivatives market be-
came so vast, opaque, complex, and fast-moving that, in itself, it became 
advantageous to powerful, sophisticated parties while also curbing the 
very possibility of its regulation. 
The United States has largely regulated derivatives through a two-
pronged approach.79  Derivatives are traded in two ways: through specia-
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lized derivative stock exchanges or privately between market partici-
pants.  Exchange-traded derivatives are formally overseen by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), which have delegated the role to organized 
exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange.  Outside the exchanges, the act of OTC derivatives trading 
was historically discouraged by a common law rule dating back to 
1884.80  In Irwin v. Williar, the court adopted a “rule against difference 
contracts” under which, in order for a court to enforce a contract, the 
demanding party would have to show to the court’s satisfaction that at 
least one of the contracting parties had an interest in the underlying as-
set.81  Therefore, speculative trading using OTC derivatives left parties 
with little legal protection if a deal were to go sour.  The courts’ ability to 
disregard speculative OTC derivatives as merely off-exchange futures 
contracts undeserving of legal enforceability meant that an incalculable 
amount of outstanding swaps were at risk of being legally invalidated.  
“This might have caused chaos in financial markets, as swaps users 
would suddenly be exposed to the risks they had used derivatives to 
avoid.”82 
The U.S. Congress changed this in 2000 with the adoption of the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act83 (CFMA), which confirmed the 
legal recognition and enforceability of purely speculative OTC deriva-
tives.  The CFMA also confirmed that OTC derivatives were off banks’ 
balance sheets and not subject to CFTC or SEC oversight.84  According 
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to Lynn Stout, the motivation behind the Act’s promulgation was largely 
to help the U.S. maintain its competitive position in global OTC deriva-
tive markets vis-à-vis its European counterparts.85 
The lack of regulatory oversight in the OTC derivatives market sig-
nificantly contributed to its exponential growth as banks began develop-
ing progressively more complex ways to leverage risk.  Other past con-
tributing factors included increased computerization, the breakdown of 
the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, and other legal 
changes in foreign exchange, credit, and capital markets.86  Today, in-
vestment bankers have turned hedging into a profitable business in its 
own right.  The pace of innovation has been extraordinary, and spurred 
by competitive pressure between global banks.  Global financial firms 
produced an ever greater volume of ever more complex synthetic securi-
ties in the run-up to the financial crisis, and they all sold.87  Futures, op-
tions, and swaps came to be traded in huge quantities both on regulated 
exchanges and over-the-counter by banks and investment firms. 
Even in the wake of the global financial crisis, OTC derivative con-
tracts are a significant percentage of the total notional credit exposure in 
U.S. and world financial markets.  The OTC derivatives market conti-
nuously expanded until the beginning of the crisis in 2008 caused it to 
shrink for the first time in its history.  The total notional value of OTC 
derivatives at its peak in June 2008 stood at around $684 trillion.88  By 
the end of 2008, the number was closer to $592 trillion.89  As of June 
                                                                                                             
 
http://www.cftc.gov/International/InternationalInitiatives/oia_otcderovst.html (using soft language to 
describe how the regulatory bodies will “work together” and with appropriate industry groups and 
participants to “promote” the development of sound internal management controls, etc.).  On efforts 
at industry self-regulation, see Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O’Brien, Financiers Plan to Put 
Controls on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/1999/01/07/business/financiers-plan-to-put-controls-onderivatives.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%2 
0Topics/People/R/Rubin,%20Robert%20E.&emc= eta1&pagewanted=1 (discussing the move to-
wards self-regulation in derivative markets, prior to the global financial crisis). 
 85. Stout, supra note 79, at 7. 
 86. MILLER, supra note 41, at 6. 
 87. Michael Lewis, The End, CONDE NAST PORTFOLIO, Nov. 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-
Streets-Boom/; Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Virginia Association 
of Economics: The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit (Mar. 10, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/. 
 88. Bank for International Settlements, Amounts outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) de-
rivatives, available at www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
 89. Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and Fi-
nancial Market Developments 46 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0 
909.pdf. 
2010] Power Without Property, Still 909 
2009, the Bank for International Settlements calculated the notional val-
ue of all types of OTC derivatives worldwide at nearly $605 trillion.90 
III.  THE PITFALLS OF DISAGGREGATED PROPERTY 
As seen in the above examples, the innovative practice of disaggre-
gating property through modern finance has not been without its pitfalls.  
The problems of disaggregation surround three common and related 
themes: complexity, lack of transparency, and excessive risk-taking, 
which together foster an environment that leads to greater concentrations 
of power. 
Complexity as Impairment 
A level of complexity inevitably accompanies financial products 
that are highly advanced and specific to addressing sophisticated risk 
management.  There is concern, however, when complexity reaches the 
point that it can impair the proper functioning of the market system.  This 
impairment, as evidenced by the global financial crisis, negatively influ-
enced the actions of consumers and industry actors, while disabling go-
verning bodies from providing effective regulatory supervision. 
At the consumer level, there was minimal understanding that the 
booming housing market was resting precariously upon a synthetic prod-
uct market.  The seemingly ever-increasing value of real estate spawned 
unscrupulous lending and borrowing.  A staff report by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York identifies one of the frictions behind the sub-
prime mortgage crisis as the inability of many sub-prime borrowers to 
understand the financial products that were being offered, since such 
products were “very complex and subject to mis-understanding and/or 
mis-representation.”91 
Complexity and asymmetrical information meant borrowers placed 
more reliance on lenders to interpret financial products.92  This allowed 
for more opportunities of abuse by mortgage originators, including pre-
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datory lending in the subprime mortgage market.93  Adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARMs) in particular were offered to borrowers as an attrac-
tive way to enter the housing market with initially low, fixed interest 
rates.  Some lenders reportedly misrepresented the terms of mortgage 
loans to financially unsophisticated borrowers, who were unaware of just 
how much their mortgage payments would increase as a result of interest 
rate changes.94 
This is not to say mortgage borrowers were entirely blameless in 
the subprime mortgage meltdown.  Mortgage fraud was common among 
borrowers.  Many borrowers falsified information within loan documents 
in order to game the housing system and make quick profits from the low 
interest rates proffered by eager lenders.95 
Steven Schwarcz has pointed out the complexity in the assets that 
underlie modern structured financial products (for example, variability in 
property values, interest rates, mortgage terms, and the creditworthiness 
of individual mortgagees),96 over-layered with complexity in the design 
of the securities themselves (for example, in the design of synthetic 
CDOs so complex that adequate disclosure to investors was virtually im-
possible),97 and exacerbated by complexity in modern financial markets 
(including indirect holding systems and the widespread use of complex 
mathematical risk modeling).98  For CDOs in particular, it has been sug-
gested that “[w]hat may be gained in diversification is lost in incompre-
hensibility.”99  The manner in which the CDO “jumbles together various 
loans, notes, receivables, mortgages, etc.” causes it to act as “a fixed-
income mutual fund with adverse selection in its construction.”100 
Complexity surrounding derivatives has also resulted in market par-
ticipants being overly dependent on credit rating agencies (CRAs) to de-
termine the risk level of CDOs and other financial products when making 
investment decisions.  Understanding the credit and default risk behind a 
particular tranche of a CDO would require an extraordinary amount of 
time and expertise.  This meant companies heavily relied upon the credit 
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rating assigned by CRAs to represent an accurate overall assessment of a 
debt obligor’s creditworthiness.  The CRA interference in market pricing 
mechanics, with regards to CDOs, would not necessarily have been as 
problematic but for the fact that the calculations behind the CRA risk 
models were wrong.  First, their models assumed housing prices would 
generally continue increasing in value and that the correlation between 
mortgage defaults would be small.101  Second, CRAs had limited to no 
information on the creditworthiness of the (multitude of) individual sub-
prime borrowers behind the MBSs and CDOs and, therefore, erroneously 
relied on historical data to compensate.102  Third and finally, the level of 
complexity behind the MBSs and CDOs became too much to handle for 
some CRAs.  In a July 2008 report on CRAs by the SEC, it noted that 
“there was a substantial increase in the number and in the complexity 
of . . . MBS and CDO deals since 2002, and some [CRAs] appeared to 
have struggled with the growth.”103 
The reliance on CRA credit ratings turned out to be very problemat-
ic with regards to firms’ risk management levels.  Sophisticated investors 
often purchased (or were permitted to purchase) a CDO note only if it 
obtained a certain credit rating, such as investment grade, from a CRA.104  
In order to generate a high return for perceived risk, these investors 
would tend to buy notes issued by CDOs that were inexpensive (i.e. had 
high yields) relative to the CRA credit rating.  However, the CDO notes 
were inexpensive because, notwithstanding the CRA credit rating, the 
market as a whole viewed them as riskier than more expensive CDO 
notes.  Thus, in a classic case of adverse selection, investors such as 
pension funds (of all things) would tend to purchase the riskiest CDO 
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notes within a certain CRA credit rating.105  When the CRAs’ risk mod-
els turned out to be based on incorrect assumptions about housing prices 
and mortgage default rates, these investors were left with particularly 
risky CDO notes. 
One of the striking lessons from the global financial crisis has been 
the impact of complexity on the financial markets, and the degree to 
which existing regulatory structures failed to manage its effects.  
Schwarcz has suggested, plausibly, that complexity is the “greatest fi-
nancial-market challenge of the future.”106  He examines how these mul-
tiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending standards, failures of 
disclosure, and a lack of transparency and even comprehensibility.  Per-
haps most difficult to manage, they also create a complex system charac-
terized by intricate causal relationships and a “tight coupling” within 
credit markets, in which events tend to amplify each other and move ra-
pidly into crisis mode.107  Prior to the global financial crisis, there was a 
general failure by all concerned to appreciate the myriad of interrelated 
ways in which complexity can impair markets and financial regulation. 
Lack of Transparency Amounts to a Lack of Accountability 
The speed of innovation, frequency of change, and unpredictability 
of newness inherent in the derivatives revolution has contributed to the 
development of nontransparent, “dark” markets within modern finance.  
The lack of transparency has resulted in dysfunction at a corporate go-
vernance level, in the financial markets, and within a broader context of 
financial regulation and also the capacity of governing bodies to provide 
meaningful oversight and accountability to sophisticated market actors. 
As Hu and Black point out, proper corporate governance has long 
been premised on a proportional relationship between economic interest 
and shareholder votes: one share, one vote.  This relationship gives 
shareholders the incentive to exercise their voting power responsibly, 
makes possible the market for corporate control, and legitimizes the 
power of management.  The ability to make one’s voting rights disappear 
when one wants to hide a stake has had obvious implications on corpo-
rate law and governance in general.  The legitimacy of managerial au-
thority following director elections may be diminished.  It can also mean 
investors (even corporate insiders) have motivations in opposition to 
those in the best interests of the company and are now able to act accor-
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dingly.  Moreover, sophisticated parties are the ones most able to take 
advantage of the power of this flexibility, which is beyond the capacity 
of small or retail investors. 
In terms of the impact on financial markets, it is clear in the wake 
of the global financial crisis that the disaggregation of property in the 
OTD model upset the normal market conditions for the exchange of 
goods and services.  Thus, market prices did not reflect the economy but 
rather a bubble, rising high in part because of the encouragement of sales 
forces.  The inability for market participants to accurately assess the val-
ue of CDOs and the ultimate deficiency of effective quality assurance on 
the part of CRAs meant the market was functioning like a market for 
lemons.108  In reaction to the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the SEC imple-
mented reform measures in 2008 to bring increased transparency to the 
credit rating process of derivatives.  Then-SEC Chairman Christopher 
Cox stated the new rules would promote the goals of the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 by “foster[ing] increased transparency, ac-
countability, and competition in the credit rating agency industry . . . .”109 
The SEC reforms seek to introduce more transparency to the CRA 
rating process.  This is an important step, but there are limits to what this 
can accomplish in the context of the OTC derivatives market, which is 
characterized by highly complex products and a lack of exchange-based 
price discovery.  Where there is underlying uncertainty anyway—for 
example, around a new or extraordinarily complex product or line of 
business—or where there is no metric for evaluating something (a com-
pliance program, a product, a risk) across institutions, the problem of 
self-interested action can be exacerbated.110  Furthermore, the inability to 
adequately observe what is transpiring in a nontransparent market means 
there is no foreseeability; thus, there is no opportunity to preemptively 
deter potential power abuses. 
Excessive Risk-Taking at the Expense of Others 
The derivatives revolution has fostered an environment of excessive 
risk-taking in financial markets.  The ability to leverage without explicit 
borrowing, through the use of derivatives, may mean greater degrees of 
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return, but also greater potential for loss.  Firms routinely engaged in 
regulatory arbitrage and short-sighted gaming behavior, without suffi-
cient attention to systemic risk.  Powerful market actors also used deriva-
tives to move their own risk downstream, provoking even greater risk-
taking behavior while leaving them with larger portions of the upside.  
The perceived capacity to fully hedge any risk fostered an environment 
that allowed many to turn a blind eye to the excessive housing market 
risk that was accumulating. 
Securitization can bring real benefits in terms of hedging and risk 
management.  After a certain point, however, those benefits are extracted 
and additional innovation exists primarily to serve speculators, to move 
risk onto others, and to generate book-level financial value that exists at 
a metaphysical remove from the “real” economy.  This poses great risk 
to systemic stability.  Even taken on their own terms—in terms of the 
benefits that structured products confer for fine-tuning risk profiles and 
improving investor choice—by design or in effect, at some point the 
costs of innovative new products outweigh their benefits to overall social 
welfare.  As the March 2009 Turner Review from the United Kingdom 
suggested, the global financial crisis has challenged the “underlying as-
sumption of financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the 
world . . . that financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since mar-
ket discipline will winnow out any unnecessary or value-destructive in-
novations.”111  On the contrary, in retrospect, some recent forms of fi-
nancial innovation delivered few benefits, but permitted rent-seeking and 
contributed to significantly increased levels of systemic risk.112  As the 
Turner Review noted: 
[I]t seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring and 
trading activity involved in the complex version of securitised credit 
[over the last ten to 15 years], was not required to deliver credit in-
termediation efficiently. Instead, it achieved an economic rent ex-
traction made possible by the opacity of margins, the asymmetry of 
information and knowledge between end users of financial services 
and producers, and the structure of principal/agent relationships be-
tween investors and companies and between companies and indi-
vidual employees.113 
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It is not surprising that the fallout from the global financial crisis 
has led to a severe backlash in American public sentiment towards risk-
taking by financial firms.  Since last year, U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner has championed a relatively circumscribed regulatory response 
to the crisis, based primarily on requiring banks to hold more capital in 
reserve to cover losses.114  Geithner’s view seems to have been that 
broad-based prohibitions on specific risky activities would be less effec-
tive, in part because such bans would unnecessarily eliminate some legi-
timate activity.  Instead, on January 21, 2010, President Barack Obama 
chose a more aggressive (and some would say populist) option.  He an-
nounced his support of the position held by Paul Volcker, former chair-
man of the U.S. Federal Reserve and head of Obama’s Economic Recov-
ery Advisory Board, by calling for limits on the size and trading activi-
ties of financial institutions in order to reduce excessive risk-taking activ-
ity.115 
Volcker has argued that banks should be prevented from taking ad-
vantage of governmental safety nets to make speculative investments.  
He stated: 
We ought to have some very large institutions whose primary pur-
pose is a kind of fiduciary responsibility to service consumers, indi-
viduals, businesses and governments by providing outlets for their 
money and by providing credit. . . .  They ought to be the core of the 
credit and financial system.  Those institutions should not engage in 
highly risky entrepreneurial activity.116 
Volcker’s proposals for structural reform in the banking industry are im-
portant in curtailing conflicts of interest and, purely in terms of outcomes 
for consumers and taxpayers, in protecting them from the risks asso-
ciated with speculative trading.  Interestingly, this is something of an 
external, or ex post, solution.  If one starts, as we do, from the proposi-
tion that excessive concentration of power is the real problem, then ad-
dressing the risk to which normal investors are exposed only tangentially 
responds to that problem.  Some firms will obviously be smaller if they 
must choose between consumer depository banking and investment 
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banking.  Yet reducing the clout of the banks is not Volcker’s primary 
goal.  If Volcker were bent on destabilizing entrenched accumulations of 
power, he would be directly advocating the breakup of “too big to fail” 
banks.  If he were focused specifically on reducing the opportunities for 
sophisticated parties to aggregate power in nontransparent ways, he 
would be focused on shoring up mechanisms to ensure transparency and 
accountability—perhaps through comprehensive reform of CRA regula-
tion, greater involvement of the exchanges, or the addition of some new 
oversight body. 
That said, there are reasons to be optimistic about the Volcker plan.  
To begin with, as noted above, placing limits on proprietary trading by 
banks that also take consumer deposits will affect the size and relative 
power of a subset of the global firms.  Also, from a purely practical pers-
pective, a bright-line prescription against a clearly-defined and fairly eas-
ily monitored activity makes regulation easier—a meaningful considera-
tion in an environment as profoundly complex as the global financial 
markets.  Perhaps, Volcker is simply being realistic about the prospects 
of trying to control the enormous OTC derivatives market, or the sophis-
ticated and influential parties that trade in it.  Rather than seek to produce 
significant change there, Volcker, in these circumstances, has perhaps 
decided simply to distance the real economy and depository banking 
from the forward trajectory of the OTC derivatives market.  In an indi-
rect but real way, this may promote more responsible behavior by return-
ing the large global banks to the ranks of businesses that, like any other 
business, can be allowed to fail. 
IV.  THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER 
The final section of this paper sketches out the fundamental distinc-
tion between Unger and Berle in terms of their understandings of power 
and its relationship to property.  For Unger, it is the public’s role (even 
destiny) to smash consolidated power and property ownership within 
society.  The trouble is that while the practice of destabilization may po-
tentially uproot forces of domination and dependence, without additional 
elements it also creates a vacuum that will be filled through the actors’ 
self-interested behavior.  Unger does not consider how power can creep 
back into new structures and models, and how reorganization only 
shakes up power momentarily unless some architecture exists to consoli-
date social welfare gains, prevent backsliding, and prevent powerful 
players from using nontransparent means to further their own ends. 
Like Unger, Berle’s work considers the possibility that property can 
be disaggregated (in his case, particularly in terms of the separation of 
ownership from control within the corporation) and evaluates the impact 
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on relative power.  Many continue to regard his book with Gardiner 
Means, The Modern Corporation, as the single most influential book in 
corporate legal history.117  Unlike Unger, however, Berle’s account sees 
dispersed and disaggregated ownership as actually permitting unaccount-
able concentrations of power—not as being the means for its destruction.  
Berle’s work is still remarkably relevant today in the wake of the deriva-
tives revolution. 
Unger and the Persistence of Power 
A common theme—in retrospect, an inevitable one—runs through 
the above narratives, concerning the ways in which sophisticated parties 
seized the opportunities presented by the disaggregation of property 
rights.  Consistent with their own self-interest, the parties doing the de-
coupling effectively kept what they wanted to keep (votes, upside risk, 
liquidity) and discarded what they did not (risk, reporting and disclosure 
obligations, assets in illiquid states).  It was sophisticated parties that had 
the capacity to work with the new tools.  Moreover, their actions in their 
own interests did not advance the general good.  Through empty voting 
and hidden ownership, sophisticated investors have ratcheted up the level 
of expertise required to compete effectively in contests for corporate con-
trol, for example, but without advancing the best interests of investors as 
a whole—indeed, while potentially undermining them—and without im-
proving corporate governance standards.  Similarly, while financial insti-
tutions’ balance sheets could be improved through hedging using deriva-
tives, selling structured finance instruments, and speculative trading, 
downside risks associated with those activities did not disappear; they 
were shifted initially to counterparties, but ultimately to be borne by the 
global economy and to a large extent, by taxpayers. 
The version of property rights disaggregation that arose as a result 
of financial innovation is not, of course, the same thing as the essentially 
state-based redistribution of wealth that Unger envisions taking place 
through property rights disaggregation.  That said, the examples above 
point to something fundamental, not contemplated by Unger, about the 
relationship between existing legal structures and priorities, such as ac-
countability and transparency.  Specifically, disaggregating property also 
disaggregates legal accountability mechanisms, premised on property 
ownership, that have developed over time in the service of advancing the 
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rule of law, protecting investors from the worst abuses, and promoting 
confidence in the markets.  New vote buying thus undermines statutory 
protections for shareholder voting rights and minority shareholders, and 
allows sophisticated parties to achieve their goals via non-transparent 
means.  This may be perceived as an even worse outcome than an al-
ready existing, but static, consolidated property right. 
Unger’s response to the derivatives problem might be that we have 
not gone far enough.  The use of structured financial products has ato-
mized equity and debt but a broadly available destabilization right (for 
example, a power to disrupt the status quo in profound ways, available 
not only to shareholders but all stakeholders including creditors, em-
ployees, local communities, citizens writ large, and representatives of the 
global environment) did not follow.118  The result is the persistence of 
features like a hollowed-out legacy mechanism for ensuring a voice 
through shareholder voting, which is no longer connected to the central 
interests to be protected and which is available to be used strategically by 
sophisticated parties.  The implication may be that society cannot meet 
Unger’s theory partway, or allow it to evolve organically—there must be 
a full throttle ideological and practical embrace of Ungerian theory in 
order to attain his conception of an empowered democracy.119 
It is far from likely that we will experience a state with a desire to 
smash consolidated property holdings—and directly threaten powerful 
interests—on a large scale.120  This is not to say that it cannot happen, as 
the trust-busting era of Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated.  So far 
though, the challenges of modern finance and the regulatory responses to 
it suggest that the establishment of broadly available destabilization 
rights is unlikely to follow the disintegration of formal property rights.  
Moreover, we cannot assume that this form of destabilization will consis-
tently happen on its own.  While it is theoretically possible that “ungo-
verned” mechanisms can create rich accountability in the absence of 
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formal mechanisms in at least some contexts,121 this is not an inevitable 
outcome.  All three narratives above demonstrate that in a world charac-
terized by considerable information asymmetries and power imbalances, 
less happy results that reflect existing power relationships may also re-
sult.  Even where acute problems associated with securitization are re-
solved, it is not clear from where the impetus will come to generate a 
fundamental revision of existing structures along Ungerian lines. 
Unger sees the promise of structural reform in context-smashing 
and self-disrupting structures.  But he does not concern himself enough 
with the insidious but determinative ways in which power hangs onto 
power while adapting to new structural environments.  Unger does not 
consider that those given control, such as the governmental representa-
tives expected to control the rotating capital fund in his model, will be-
come the new power holders that those with resources will begin to soli-
cit.122 
Similarly, even where ambitious reformative steps are taken to 
force structural reform, as Volcker proposes, the examples above suggest 
that power will try to reinsert itself at every decision-making juncture.  In 
fact, the examples above should be seen as useful case studies of how, in 
practice, an aspirational theory premised on flexibility and destabiliza-
tion is likely to be interpreted and put in operation in specific situations.  
With respect to corporate governance, financial institutions’ lending 
practices, and global markets generally, property has been disaggregated 
for the purpose of permitting its component pieces to be employed as 
tools by powerful interests, in their own interests.  The consequence has 
not been the de-insulation of power from contestation; what we have 
seen, rather, is less transparency, less accountability, and greater concen-
tration of power.123 
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Implications for New Governance 
While Unger’s work is not generally at the center of practical con-
versations about regulation, new governance theory, which owes a sub-
stantial debt to Unger, increasingly is.  Over the last decade, some new 
governance theorists have picked up and elaborated on Unger’s destabi-
lization rights concept and its relationship to structural reform.124 
“New governance” is an umbrella term that captures within it sev-
eral discrete but related scholarly approaches, applied across a range of 
specific subject areas.125  Relative to the Ungerian approach, new gover-
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nance moves away from the theoretical plane to focus more on improv-
ing the responsiveness, representativeness, and effectiveness of existing 
institutions.126  It draws insight from contemporary regulatory theory127 
and from theoretical antecedents beyond Unger, including Teubnerian 
reflexive law,128 Deweyan pragmatism,129 and neo-Madisonian republi-
canism.130 
For purposes of this paper, the essential components of a new go-
vernance approach are, above all, a commitment to permitting flexibility 
and context-sensitivity in regulatory design, generally for the same pur-
poses that Unger describes: to advance human flourishing and what, in 
one formulation, are described as the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity.131  At this level, a critique of Ungerian theory 
should also provoke reflection with respect to its more practically-
minded cousin, new governance.  New governance scholarship proceeds 
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from the conviction that the best way to address public questions—better 
than so-called “command-and-control” regulation132 or the perpetuation 
of “immovable [legal] boundary stones”133—is through decentralized 
decision-making by those possessing the best contextual information.  
The new governance regulator prioritizes mechanisms that share infor-
mation from localized experiments134 and that push localities to improve 
by comparison to the experience of others, rather than trying to regulate 
via detailed, process-based regulatory requirements.  As a matter of insti-
tutional design, it relies on information-based and information-forcing 
techniques; specifically, reason-giving, transparent processes, ben-
chmarking and outcome analysis, and participatory and carefully struc-
tured dialogue. 
The notion of contingency, or revisability, is as essential to new 
governance as it is to Unger.  At the level of social theory, the revisabili-
ty of starting positions gives participants the freedom to work through 
differences in unexpected ways, and to identify new possibilities around 
even seemingly intractable problems.  In the words of Chuck Sabel and 
Bill Simon, speaking about public law litigation, “destabilization through 
new public law creates opportunities for collaborative learning and dem-
ocratic accountability that the more certain world of pluralist bargaining 
under the aegis of courts or legislatures often precludes.”135  In terms of 
practical problem-solving, open-ended and flexible processes permit a 
pragmatic learning-by-doing method that is promising from an outcome-
oriented perspective.  For the regulator as well, embedded within the new 
governance approach is the recognition that regulators (especially in fast-
moving and complex sectors, such as global finance) are knowledge-poor 
relative to the industries they regulate.  New governance-style methods 
support industry-level innovation, seeking to then fold situational learn-
ing up into regulatory expectations through industry best practices and 
outcome analysis.136 
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New governance values incrementalism and learning-by-doing, as it 
should, because new governance starts from the premise that in an in-
creasingly complex and decentered (or at least polycentric and net-
worked) world, the path to human flourishing is through permitting in-
novation and parallel experimentation, and creating flexible and revisa-
ble structures that open the door to new possibilities.137  Yet, the stories 
above are cautionary tales about some potential effects of innovation, 
flexibility, and complexity on transparency, accountability, and power.  
While a full response to these challenges is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, it seems evident that new governance scholars need to take seriously 
the risk that the phenomena described above will replicate themselves in 
the interstices of many new governance processes, including those in 
fields other than financial regulation.  A clear view of human nature 
needs to be at the core of the new governance model because within fluid 
space, it will drive process and outcomes.  Understanding how people 
and their institutions operate, individually and in groups, requires us to 
build in compensatory responses in regulatory design in the same way 
that we would design for other predictable flaws. 
We may also need to consider whether and to what degree back-
ground factual or legal uncertainty will generate new ideas that increase 
general social welfare.  Conditions of deep instability are sometimes 
proposed as the moment when new governance approaches stand the best 
chance of being realized—times when no one knows what the solution to 
a problem might be, or how to get there, but everyone knows that the 
status quo cannot persist.138  Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert 
Scott similarly describe a promising “contracting for innovation” phe-
nomenon arising around interfirm collaboration, as a response to what 
they understand as a problem of “Knightian” uncertainty.139  The trouble 
is that power relationships assert themselves in fluid space, such as the 
space between ownership and voting rights created through mechanisms 
like empty voting and hidden ownership.140  In other words, instability 
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and fluidity may well generate new structures but on their own may not 
generate new structures that are actually better for the common welfare 
than the old ones were.  The resulting lack of transparency not only can 
be, but in practice is designed to be, beneficial to the powerful actors that 
are employing these devices.  Those that benefit from it will resist efforts 
to force transparency and accountability both overtly, and in hard-to-
measure ways.141 
This leads us to Berle, whose instincts on human nature, power, and 
property are essential here.  Like Unger, Berle talks about the disaggre-
gation of the traditional bundle of rights we know as property.  Also like 
Unger, it seems clear that what Berle was actually talking about was 
power.  Unger uses the language of property, particularly his “consoli-
dated property right,” as a tool to convey his underlying concerns over 
the abuse of power at the hands of entrenched ruling groups.  Berle, as 
well, was very aware of property’s close link to power, stating “[t]here is 
no unit of power measurement comparable to the inexact but revealing 
dollar-unit used in respect of property.”142  Berle understood, as Unger 
did, the risks and implications of a small minority carrying a large pro-
portion of the population’s wealth. 
Berle and Modern Finance 
The derivatives revolution is reminiscent of Berle and Means’ iden-
tification of the divergence of interest between ownership and control in 
the corporation, but metastacized, fractalized, and multiplied.  Berle and 
Means saw the connection between disaggregated property and the con-
centration of power and later, Berle himself recognized the need for 
checks and balances to ensure large bodies of power would be held ac-
countable. 
Is Berle’s perspective more sensible, or more predictive, than Un-
ger’s pro-destabilization agenda?  Berle and Means recognized some of 
the concerns associated with exchanging physical property for fungible, 
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notional instruments that operate in an ever-changing, liquid environ-
ment.  They observed that in liquid markets, the owner is “practically 
powerless through his own efforts to affect the underlying property.”143  
Thus, while Unger believed a disaggregation of property meant a more 
engaged citizenry and the elimination of opportunities for discrete groups 
to hoard power, Berle and Means claimed the opposite: that dispersed or 
decentralized ownership may very well mean greater passivity on the 
part of shareholders, and reduced accountability by managers to their 
shareholders.  The concentration of power arising from the separation of 
ownership and control was starkly apparent to Berle and Means: 
Within [the corporate system] there exists a centripetal attraction 
which draws wealth together into aggregations of constantly in-
creasing size, at the same time throwing control into the hands of 
fewer and fewer men. The trend is apparent; and no limit is as yet in 
sight. . . .  So far as can be seen, every element which favored con-
centration still exists, and the only apparent factor which may end 
the tendency is the limit in the ability of a few human beings effec-
tively to handle the aggregates of property brought under their con-
trol.144 
Berle was also apparently one of the first to characterize the separation 
between registered share owners and beneficial owners in terms of a se-
paration of voting from economic interests.  In his 1959 book, Power 
Without Property,145 Berle stated that the corporate share in carrying 
rights to both distributions and votes, had begun to split.  This was due to 
the increasing role of “fiduciary institutions” (such as institutional hold-
ers, pension trusts, mutual funds, and insurance companies) purchasing 
shares on behalf of beneficiaries and thus becoming the holders with vot-
ing rights.146  By virtue of contract, these institutions would be required 
to provide the dividends or other benefits for distribution among its bene-
ficiaries the separate holders of economic ownership.  In this context, 
when warning of the perils of disaggregated ownership, Berle empha-
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sized the need to appropriately govern the changing relationship between 
power and property, stating: 
The breakdown of the economic unit we regarded as “property” into 
its component elements may be matter of economic analysis. But 
one outstanding result of it – the erection of organizations largely 
resting on and certainly developing power – plainly raises problems 
whose nature is essentially political.147 
It is Berle’s recognition of the human desire to have power that puts 
him at some remove from Unger.  Unger seems to assume that through 
careful and continually improving social design, one can structure (or 
destructure) power relationships and build in ongoing contestability; but 
he does not seriously consider the torque that human nature will impose 
on that design.  Berle, by contrast, puts human nature at the foundation of 
his analysis. 
Of course, Berle could not have imagined the degree to which 
property would break down through the derivatives revolution and the 
phenomenon of new vote buying.148  Arguably, he also underestimated 
the risk (or perhaps it was smaller then) that economic power would 
come to influence broader social policy and political decisions.  He felt 
that “[a]bsent combination with other forms, economic power is indeed 
impressive but not uncontrollable.”149  He was not as concerned as Unger 
continued to be about significant concentrations of economic power, so 
long as there was a responsible government and an active public consen-
sus to monitor it.  Berle also asserted that the “public consensus” could 
act as an efficient check and balance on concentrated economic power.  
Berle noted, candidly, that “[a]t all events, the outline of a democratic 
economy does emerge as that of concentrated economic power,” and he 
was clear in noting that there are dangers related to such power.  Howev-
er, he argued that concentrated economic power was checked by, and 
responsible to, an uncommitted citizenry that had the ability to direct 
such power through the choices they made in the markets.  He contended 
that “[i]n economic as in political government, a people gets (more or 
less) the government it deserves.  Certainly that is true in as sensitive and 
free a democracy as ours.”150  Thus, while Unger believed that those 
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holding the property would ultimately exercise control (overt or covert) 
over the citizenry, Berle saw economic and political power as meaning-
fully distinct.151 
This perspective may be less tenable today.  There is evidence to 
suggest that today economic and political power elites overlap to a sub-
stantial degree, and that the agendas of powerful financial interests hold 
considerable weight with elected representatives.152  In financial history, 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act demonstrates that legislators some-
times have little choice but to react to events already happening on the 
ground among private parties.153  (That story is also among the many that 
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highlight the cross-pollination between the financial industry and its reg-
ulators.154)  The recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, which eliminated the ban on corporate 
political spending, could magnify this point in the future.155 
If anything, our divergence with Berle on the connection between 
economic and political power only causes us to take more seriously his 
argument that the human will to acquire power is an inescapable reality 
that must be grappled with, not only at the level of institutional structure, 
but also at the mundane but crucial level of implementation.  Berle rec-
ognized that “a power vacuum is always filled by a power holder . . . .”156  
Thus, for Berle, the issue was not about removing sources of power—or 
in Unger’s case, having those in power being subject to ongoing destabi-
lization—but about ensuring that those in power are properly and effec-
tively regulated, taking into account both the blatant and the subtle ways 
in which power operates. 
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The regulatory solutions to current dilemmas, then, must be alive to 
the problems created by concentrated power.  Additionally, as lessons in 
modern finance have shown, the response to problems of power should 
not be toward institutional design alone, unless that institutional design 
contains as a core element accurate instincts about human nature.  Un-
ger’s prescription for destabilization rights is an important one.  Destabi-
lization rights continue to play an essential, and instinctively attractive, 
role in responding to the anti-democratic entrenchment of powerful in-
terests.  At the same time, destabilization brings with it uncertainty and 
as it turns out, there is more to ensuring social welfare than ensuring a 
high degree of social and institutional plasticity.  There may be situations 
in which the disadvantages of fluid processes (in terms of increased 
complexity, decreased transparency, reduced regulatory capacity to pro-
vide meaningful oversight, and greater opportunities to concentrate pow-
er) are very significant.  In order to succeed, regulatory reform in the fi-
nancial sector will have to anticipate the ways in which all available tools 
will be used by the most adept actors to advance their own ends and ex-
pand their own power.  In this regard, Berle’s insights about human na-
ture and how power can become concentrated in fluid environments can-
not be ignored. 
 
